Abstract -Modern critical infrastructure systems are built on a hodgepodge of complex, interconnected information systems for control and management. For electric power, the critical infrastructure includes the physical systems; comprised of power generation, transmission and distribution capabilities. The control of the physical systems is accomplished via Supervisory Command and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. The SCADA systems employ both new and legacy systems along with many of the same information system devices as traditional business information systems. SCADA system networks, just as business information system networks, are connected to external networks, including the Internet. Thus, SCADA systems are vulnerable to the same classes of threats as other networked computer systems in addition to threats associated with their legacy systems. Many of these systems have been put in place for decades and often have an unknown security posture. Cyber security analysis of these systems remains a significant challenge. Traditional techniques such as red-teaming, vulnerability assessments, and penetration testing are often unsatisfactory and limited in scope because power utilities do not want to risk taking the systems off-line or degrading or damaging the expensive equipment. The consequence is that the effects of a cyber-attack on these SCADA systems are often unknown.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many critical infrastructure systems rely on complex information systems for control and management. The information systems are used in both the business activities as well as the control of the critical infrastructure system. In the case of electric power, the critical infrastructure includes the physical systems; comprised of power generation, transmission and distribution capabilities. The control of the physical systems is accomplished via Supervisory Command and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Today's SCADA systems employ many of the same information system devices as traditional business information systems. SCADA system networks, just as business information system networks, are connected to external networks, including the Internet. Thus, SCADA systems are vulnerable to the same classes of threats as other networked computer systems.
II. MODERN SCADA SYSTEM THREATS
Threats to SCADA systems and other industrial control systems (ICS) have been on the rise. Cyber weapons, like Stuxnet, shined the light in an already volatile and under-secured environment. Adding to the challenge of securing ICS infrastructures is the use of tools that are intended to help a system owner better understand their security posture being used to create exploits. These tools can enable the development of exploits for ICS infrastructures that can be released for profit. Cyber security challenges are further complicated by the highly complex, interconnected networks of ICS that use generationally different physical equipment and applications than normal enterprise applications and infrastructure.
SCADA system networks are interconnected to the critical infrastructure organization's other networks, including those that are connected to the Internet. SCADA systems have evolved to include standard PCs and operating systems, and TCP/IP based protocols. The connectivity of the organization's various information systems is important to the organization's effective and efficient operation. However, the connectivity also introduces additional paths for cyber-attacks. SCADA systems' diverse and geographically distributed locations require remote access capabilities and thus sometimes use the Internet for connectivity.
Cyber security threats to SCADA systems can be grouped as follows:
Malware -SCADA systems are comprised of operating systems and software applications that are vulnerable to viruses, worms, trojans and spyware. SCADA system extended connectivity provides increasing opportunities to become infected with malware.
Hacker -Individuals or groups with intent on causing disruption may access SCADA networks and collect data and disrupt data flows with the intent to distrupt the physical system under control. The physical disruption could be a power outage or water delivery system interruption. Insider -A person that has permission to access the network can cause disruption to the company information systems or physical system. An insider with access may be able to increase access to physical assets and disrupt their operation via the SCADA system.
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Given the high value of the information carried by SCADA systems, they are often targeted for attack. To protect SCADA systems from cyber-attack, the latest and most advanced security methods are used. Also important to securing these types of information systems are analysis methods and tools that measure the effectiveness of selected security approaches. Thus, tools are necessary for organizations to analyze their information systems' security, reliability, and resilience against cyber-attack.
The most widely-used security analysis technique used by SCADA system specialists is based on evaluation of hardware destined for placement in the SCADA system. Here, specialists build and configure the system from physical equipment that they have purchased. The SCADA system is instrumented using network diagnostic equipment and connecting computers to the networks to generate appropriate traffic. While very accurate, this approach is problematic for two reasons. First, the equipment can be very expensive to acquire, configure, instrument, and maintain. Second, instrumentation and experimentation can be extremely challenging. It is difficult to correlate traffic events that move across the SCADA system and, as a result, difficult to roll up studies and generate system-level information.
Additionally, once the system becomes operational, cyber security testing is difficult to perform because it introduces an unacceptable risk to the disruption of the critical systems they control.
SCADA specialists also use simulation extensively. There are numerous simulation tools in existence for studying network performance issues. Today's simulation tools have extensive capabilities and high accuracy. The simulation tools have extensive probing capabilities that make it possible to correlate events and generate system-level information. Simulation tools have been used primarily to analyze data capacity performance and help information system (IS) users accomplish expansion studies. Currently, few simulation tools have the necessary network device fidelity that would enable specialists to effectively evaluate various security implementations and analyze threats and vulnerabilities at scale. Most simulation tools accurately represent the data link and network transport layers, but do not sufficiently model the application layer and programs.
To overcome the problems with security analysis using either an exclusive hardware SCADA testbed or a simulation of a SCADA system, Sandia National Labs has developed a cyber security analysis capability using physical hardware, emulated machines, and simulation. Key aspects of our hybrid approach to cyber security analysis have been published [1] [2] [3] .
Throughout this report the terms simulated nodes, emulated nodes, and physical (i.e., real) nodes are used. In this report, simulated refers to the nodes represented through simulation tools; in our case OPNET Modeler [5] . Simulated nodes generally use unique and abstracted implementations of the protocols and software running on virtualized hardware. Emulated nodes use real software, for instance an actual Windows OS, but run on emulated or virtualized machines. Physical nodes are the real software running on real hardware. In cases, we also use surrogate applications which represent the functionality of the software but not the exact software used in the target system under study.
III. METHODOLOGY
At Sandia National Labs, our cyber-physical security analysis approach includes experimentation on realistic testbeds. Techniques and expertise are used to identify system-level vulnerabilities, consequence if the vulnerability is exploited, and security approaches to eliminate the vulnerability. System-level consequences are difficult to determine if multiple vulnerabilities are exploited simultaneously. Testing on operational systems or on testbeds is effective in determining system level impacts. Testing on operational systems in most cases is not possible because of the risk to the operational system and its mission. Building an experimental system identical to the operational system is cost prohibitive. Software models of the devices and system are typically not available or, if available, lack features related to cyber security analysis. An effective method to create a cyber-physical security experimentation platform is via a hybrid testbed.
We have developed a hybrid testbed methodology that can be used to perform cyber-physical security analysis. The methodology enables building models of both the SCADA system and the physical system. The model of the SCADA system may include its connectivity to the various business networks and, in cases, its connectivity to the Internet. The physical system model is selected from various solvers for the physical system under study. In a hybrid experiment the SCADA system events and the physical system events are joined in lockstep to create realistic operation. Figure 1 illustrates the hybrid testbed methodology and the how the testbed has variable realism vs. cost and setup time. 
IV. MODELED SCADA SYSTEM USED IN HYBRID TESTBED EXPERIMENT
To demonstrate the cyber analysis methodology applied to SCADA systems we created a model of a SCADA system that included modeled Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). An IED, such as a protective relay, may communicate directly to the SCADA Server, or a local Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) may poll the IED to collect the data and pass it to the SCADA Server. IEDs provide a direct interface to control and monitor equipment and sensors.
The modeled SCADA system also includes a Human-Machine Interface (HMI), SCADA server, and other components to manage the overall system. The SCADA system management devices are typically located in a control center. Typically the connectivity between the control center and the remotely located devices is via a wide area network (WAN). A typical SCADA system connectivity to the corporate network and Internet is shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2: Typical corporate network [6]
The SCADA control center includes a LAN that provides network connectivity to the various devices in the control center. Additional connectivity for the control center network is to the business network. In most configurations the connectivity between the control center network and business corporate network is protected with a network firewall. The business corporate network, in most cases, has connectivity to the Internet. A typical corporate information system that includes various network components including a control system network and connectivity to IEDs and RTUs is shown in Figure 2 . Figure  2 also includes locations where an attack may take place. The figure also notes the type of attack that can occur from a specific location.
A key aspect of our cyber analysis is the modeling of protocols that enable communication in the control system network. In our analysis three protocols are of particular interest: ModbusTCP, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), and IEC 60870. ModbusTCP and DNP3 have been implemented in our testbed and IEC 60870 is partially implemented. As new standards of communication for SCADA protocols appear, our modular methodology can be extended to include the protocols.
IEDs may be directly polled and controlled by the SCADA server or RTUs and in some cases have local configurations and functionality that allows for the IED to act without direct instructions from the SCADA control center. The control of the IED by the SCADA server requires that ModbusTCP, DNP3, and IEC 60870 packets be transported over the networks that provide connectivity. It is this network connectivity that makes the SCADA control potentially vulnerable to the same classes of attacks that the corporate business network is subject to.
V. SIMULATED AND EMULATED DEVICES USED IN THE HYBRID TESTBED EXPERIMENT
Our methodology enables the creation of a SCADA system using simulated, emulated, and real devices in a single hybrid experiment. Each of the specific experimental domains has advantages and disadvantages. The system components that are represented in each domain should be carefully selected to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages.
SIMULATED:
Network simulation tools such as OPNET Modeler are designed in part to allow analysts, engineers and researchers to understand how network protocols perform under various traffic loads and device configurations. Analysts can implement and deploy these protocols on networks of simulated devices, trace messages that the devices send between one another, and collect statistics on the resultant traffic including packet delays. Only recently has network M&S been identified as a tool to be used in cyber security analysis.
A key advancement that enabled using network M&S tools in cyber security analysis has been the capability to interface real network devices with simulated devices and pass network traffic between them. The means of interfacing real network traffic with simulated traffic is available with OPNET's system-in-theloop (SITL) capability.
The limitations of using M&S for cyber security analysis must be recognized. When using network M&S in a hybrid testbed to perform cyber security analysis it must be understood that the modeled network components represent the behavior of real network devices in their configurations and capability to transport network traffic but accomplish this through different implementations of the network protocols. Device operating system (OS) and application vulnerabilities are not modeled with OPNET Modeler network modeling tools.
The network device model can represent the real device in its configuration of security features such as filter rules and access control lists (ACLs). Most devices provide a variety of configuration options that users can set, based on their own security versus convenience tradeoffs. If configurations in a real device permit or deny an attack, it is expected that the model with the same configuration will permit or deny the same attack vector.
A key part of our hybrid testbed is the capability to interface real SCADA devices and subsystems to simulated SCADA devices and subsystems. The real part of the experiment could be a workstation connecting to a logically distant IED over an extensive simulated network or various traffic sources and sinks 4 of 8 communicating over a network comprised of real and simulated parts. Combining real and simulated devices into a single experiment requires the SITL interfaces to translate data packets or datagrams between real and simulated domains. SITL employs translation functions to interface packets or datagrams between the two domains. Translation functions are necessary for cases where a datagram is created in one domain, either simulated or real, and interpreted in another domain.
In cases where the simulated network is transporting the data from one real device to another, the translations are limited to the header portion of the data packets. The payload of the data packets can remain as a block of bits. Since the simulation may include filter rules in modeled routers and switches and ACLs in modeled firewalls, the data packet headers are read, interpreted, and acted upon in the same manner as a real device with the same configuration.
In the case of ModbusTCP, DNP3 and IEC 60870, if the IED exists outside of the network simulator and the SCADA controller also exists outside of the simulator then it is not necessary to parse the application-level fields of the data packet. It is only necessary to parse the Ethernet and IP fields of the packet. In contrast, if either the IEDs or SCADA controller is modeled in the network simulator then complete parsing of the entire ModbusTCP, DNP3 or IEC 60870 packet is required.
EMULATED:
In order to represent authentic network services, virtual machines (VMs) are utilized as surrogate systems functioning as hosts and servers supporting the various applications. In the example SCADA system under test, physical hardware solutions are utilized to provide services such as DNS and proxies. By utilizing VMs, several key advantages are encountered. First, given modern hardware, it is possible to virtualize a significant portion of the experiment, thus enabling numerous services and devices to be consolidated into a single, portable computing system, resulting in a cost efficient alternative to using proprietary hardware solutions.
Virtualization is also used to emulate Cisco routers in the hybrid testbed. The emulated Cisco router is based on Dynamips software [8] that enables the use of a real Cisco IOS to emulate actual routers. The functionality of the implemented Dynamips router depends on the Cisco IOS image used. Dynamips supports most of the functions of a Cisco router and currently emulates the 7200, 3700, 3600, and 2600 series of Cisco routers. The emulated routers, in comparison to the real Cisco router hardware, have a much lower packet forwarding rate. Nevertheless, for the sake of many cyber experiments, this shortcoming becomes irrelevant as the need to prove reachability can be easily configured and examined at low cost.
PHYSICAL:
Physical devices are also included in hybrid cyber experiments. The devices are connected to the experiment in the same way that the device is connected to an operational system. The physical device will create, sink, and pass traffic as the device would in an operational system.
As with incorporating emulated device representations in an experiment, incorporating physical devices requires that the simulated part of the experiment run at a real-time simulation rate. This requires the capability of the simulation to be throttled to real-time. This is not a problem in most cases if the simulator hardware can simulate faster than real time. Throttling is of no use if the simulator runs slower than real time.
Combining virtualization with simulation through SITL enables analysts to create experiments with varying levels of fidelity.
The approach provides for placing fidelity, with hardware for example, in only the components or areas of interest without having to incur the cost of exactly duplicating the entire system. In Figure 3 we illustrate the hybrid-experiment topology. 
VI. SCADA SECURITY ASSESSMENT DEMONSTRATION EXPERIMENT AND SETUP
The objective of the demonstration experiments is to explore what classes of cyber threats and effects can be conducted and modeled using our methodology. Additionally our objective includes verification of our experiment. A key part of our testbed research is to provide a fairly complex, faithful network that represents the real world. This enables red teams and blue teams to have enough realism and complexity to navigate in order to provide diverse traffic sources, destinations, and data traffic. The services, applications, and protocols must be as close to real world such that potential artifacts are minimized and a true evaluation of the threat can be represented. This is necessary to provide effects analysts' confidence in the results produced by the testbed environment.
The components of the experiment are created in the simulation, emulation, and/or physical (SEP) domains [2] . Additionally, our methodology supports the capability to interchange which 5 of 8 domain (i.e., SEP) a component of the experiment is represented. This can be used as part of a validation of modeled component behavior. Modeled component behavior is validated by testing the same system with modeled components replaced by physical components and comparing the system results.
Note that the experiment architectures discussed in this paper are contrived, however, representative of real system networks. The focus of the experimentation discussed in this paper is not on large scale. We recognize the importance of large scale and believe this approach can scale to hundreds, if not thousands of SEP devices such as hosts, IEDs, and routers. In the demonstration experiment we do not represent every element in a real SCADA network. Our demonstration is primarily a proof of concept to assess the SEP technologies and to determine the methodology effectiveness in representing real systems and to determine the effects of real threats and assess the security posture of the system.
The demonstration experiment includes three networks that comprise the infrastructure owner's information systems. The networks are the external network or Internet, enterprise network, and control system network.
Figure 4: Simulated segment of experimental network
The Internet Network This is the network that the internal users would interact with; websites like Google, CNN.com, etc. are represented. The rational is that this network is connected to the Internet and thus subjected to potential attacks originating from the Internet, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), drive by downloads and targeted spam. In our experiment we emulated several thousand websites, unique domains, and created the correct DNS entries (both root and referred) for complete access. Other services that were hosted: FTP servers and mail servers. These services were hosted on virtualized machines and virtualized networks leveraging VMware ESX as a base platform and created tens of virtual switches for connectivity. Although the various services and applications could be hosted on physical devices, which we did do initially at smaller scale, from an experiment deployment and management view it is much more effective to host all the devices on virtual machines. Network routing protocols such as BGP were used for internet routing on both simulated and emulated network devices. Emulation of network routers was achieved through the use of Vyatta software routers. We did also test functionality by introducing both a Cisco 2600 router and a Juniper M61 router.
The Enterprise Network
This network is where business services are hosted and where users access the services. Traditional functions such as billing and reporting are located in this part of the network. The network is comprised of a layered network topology of an external zone, DMZ (de-militarized zone) and the internal network. The majority of the routing in this environment, including virtual private network (VPN) connectivity, was achieved by using OPNET Modeler and leveraging SITL. Common internal enterprise services such as internal DNS, proxy services, and email were implemented as you would find in modern operations and internal routing protocols such as OSPF (hosted by both simulation and emulation) is used to route internally between the different LANs.
The Control System Network
This network hosts all the SCADA-specific field devices at remote locations and provides connectivity for reporting to the SCADA control center. Here we leverage device representations in different experiment domains such as physical, virtual and simulated firewalls, emulated and physical RTUs, emulated front-end processors (FEPs) (hosted by an emulated application), HMIs (custom HMI that sends and receives traffic) and engineering workstations. Control system devices such as RTUs are simulated in the Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE) [6] . The devices all produced and responded to authentic SCADA protocols including ModbusTCP, DNP3, and IEC 60870.
VII. SECURITY ASSESSMENT DEMONSTRATION EXPERIMENT -SECURITY MECHANISMS
The conducted experiment was based on a variety of concepts of operations, mostly focusing on using red-team methods on the experimental system and evaluating if the SEP environment can faithfully respond to the red-team methods. The red-team's objective is to identify security flaws so that system security can be increased to prevent unauthorized access to the system. The red-team's attempts at emulating unauthorized accesses are primarily focused in two areas: Attempts originating in the control system network and attempts originating from the business environment. Each of these vantage points has vulnerabilities that result in different system-level effects. Assessing the vulnerabilities require different red-team methods and hacker tools.
A review of contemporary literature on this topic is very limited. The references that were identified primarily focused on representing denial of service cyber-attacks [9] . Although this is a very real and contemporary attack, many systems may be susceptible to a variety of other exploits that need to be studied as well.
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A. Analysis of Cyber-Attacks Targeting the Business Network The corporate network is a more open and accessible network when compared to the control system network. They have access to Internet resources and can be susceptible to a variety of open and known vulnerabilities. However, its security posture has a direct impact on overall security since this network can be directly connected to the SCADA network and thus provides a vantage point to infiltrate or exfiltrate data, conduct reconnaissance activities, and capture usernames and passwords, among a variety of different hacker techniques.
In order to assess the security posture of the network a variety of experimental red-team scenarios were conducted against the experimental corporate network. The red team assessed the system security to resist the following:
Reconnaissance -The red team assessed the business network external facing security by examining what data can be collected from this point (e.g. enumerating the DMZ). In our experiment, we leveraged common tools such as NMAP to conduct the reconnaissance. A variety of different types of scans (e.g., xmas) were used and they returned the expected information. This demonstrated that there are no corruptions or artifacts introduced by the hybrid experimentation environment.
Resistance to common hacker tools -The red team also examined the experimental system's response to common hacker tools such as Metasploit. Metasploit was used to assess the system's security of business network services (e.g., mail, http, proxy). In our experiment most hacker attempts were filtered and blocked by the simulated firewall; again demonstrating faithful function of the network. Next, we added a Snort intrusion protection system (IPS) to perform signature-based alerting on the inbound traffic. Snort performed as expected by alerting on several hacker attempts launched against the web server.
To examine our testbed's response to known hacker exploits on specific services, we loaded a vulnerable service on a DMZ entity and exposed its port to the outside world. In our experiment this modeled a zero-day vulnerability in a critical service that was comprised in our demonstration experiment. This demonstrated that in our testbed malicious traffic was generated from a physical machine, moved across virtual and simulated routers and switches and passed a physical IPS with a payload that resulted in a compromise of the machine. After adding a Snort rule for that payload, the experiment was repeated. This time the IPS detected the malicious payload as it entered the network. This demonstrates that the actual tools and techniques used on our testbed result in the same system response as if they were executed on an operational system with the same security posture.
In order to increase the complexity of the network, we deployed a VPN tunnel that originated outside the external facing firewall and terminated inside the DMZ. This VPN was modeled in the simulation part of the testbed and included all aspects of a VPN except the actual encryption of the payload. Assessing the VPN protocol transactions is a valid experiment using the testbed. Attempts to assess the encrypted payload are not valid studies on the testbed since no encryption is used in the experiment.
In another experiment, we assume a compromise of one user and assess the system's ability to resist and/or alert on malicious activity from that user's machine. The compromised user can be either inside the business network or accesses the internal applications and services through a VPN from their remote machine. In our testbed we demonstrated that, as expected, system reconnaissance can be performed. As expected, since the IPS is externally facing, it did not alert as we executed several experiments on the testbed. We also experimented with common hacker tools to determine the system's ability to detect malicious activity under different security postures. Included in the experiment are hosts with different operating systems and configurations. We identified which hosts and configurations were subject to compromise and difficulty in identifying the vulnerability using open source tools found in Metaspoit. Other open-source tools were used to assess the ability of the system to resist and detect data exfiltration. Using the testbed we attempted to exfiltrate a variety of files from some of the compromised machines, including SAM files, PDFs, and Word documents, to an external server. The testbed system responded as an operational system under these studies.
Using the testbed we also assessed the system impacts of a number of Business Logic Attacks (BLA) under various system configurations and assumptions. On the testbed, we assumed there were users in the corporate network that were infected by a malicious PDF download that included a Trojan on to their machine. We also assessed the security by assuming users clicked on malicious links of a site that has an XSS vulnerability and examined the impacts as increasing number of users were infected.
B. Analysis of Cyber-Attacks Against the Control System Network
The control system is often overlooked as a target for attack by security personnel. Reasons include that applications and machines that are found within these networks are limited and access to other networks is restricted. As a consequence, the security posture of these networks should be thoroughly assessed and these networks should be monitored closely.
The following tests were conducted from a number of vantage points on the control system network. The experiment assumption is that a control system network has been comprised though some means. Using the testbed we assessed the capability of the control system network to resist and/or detect malicious behavior. In the experiment, we attempted to faithfully create, modify and change the state of SCADA specific protocols (both DNP3 and ModbusTCP) using common opensource techniques.
To demonstrate how well the testbed represents the various protocol layers including the lower layers we created a generic 7 of 8 man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. Using the testbed we created scenarios where network devices on the experimental control system are represented as simulated devices and the communication link is intentionally compromised by an emulated computer used by a hacker. The compromised link can be manipulated in the experimental system as in a live system. This demonstrates our testbeds ability to reproduce data traffic on the network lower layers and have the simulated, emulated, and physical domains interoperate. SCADA system networks must be immune to MITM attacks and should be thoroughly assessed.
On our testbed we assessed a basic SCADA network topology to demonstrate how the testbed can be used in the security assessment. Although the field device network is segregated by a firewall, it still is networked to the control systems environment where the HMI is reporting status and the FEP is polling and sending commands to the field devices. With this vantage point in the experiment and configuration assumptions, we are able to leverage several open source tools to conduct a MITM of the communications between the SCADA applications and any field device. In this experiment we demonstrate an ARPSpoof technique can advertise a spoofed ARP "is-at" message on the unencrypted link. Testing again with an improved security posture we show that the vulnerability is eliminated. Using our testbed methodology we are able to demonstrate the MITM exploit on emulated devices, physical devices, and even simulated devices. In our testbed, all these system-level demonstrations respond similarly to the MITM exploit. It was verified that each device advertising the ARP is-at command resulted in the same SEP ARP tables and the tables included logs of the MITM box as the MAC address and was sending Layer 2 traffic to that device.
On our testbed, after the MITM is conducted on the unsecured link, we demonstrated that the link is fully compromised. Since there is no encryption, such as provided by a VPN or SSL, we are able to modify anything in that link including dropping packets or just forward them on without modification. Also on the unsecured link, we demonstrated on the testbed a denial of service experiments and showed that we could either deny service to a field device as well as disrupting heartbeat messages back from a field device. We also forwarded the traffic, showing that everything operated normally. Additionally, having presence on the link, we did do Wireshark and tcpdump packet parsing on all traffic. This demonstrated that in our testbed we could passively monitor the state of the control system, passively enumerate the devices that communicate back to the SCADA applications and know what their normal operating conditions were for future action. Following the demonstrations on the unsecured link, we used a simulated VPN to demonstrate that these vulnerabilities could no longer be executed on the secured link as expected in an operational system.
In our experiments we tested the effects of disrupting ModbusTCP and DNP3 communication with field devices or SCADA applications to assess system-level impacts to compromise. Since, on the unsecured link, we were able to modify the traffic in stream and produce false results to the SCADA applications. This provided insights into system impacts as the number of and location of devices were modified. Using open-source tools we demonstrated the importance of securing these links since unsecured links can lead to an attacker modifying packets that would have disruptive effects. Results were verified by using the VCSE analysis tools to verify that network disruptions led to the expected physical effects. In our testbed, we were able to demonstrate the impacts of an unsecure control network resulting in the HMI reporting in accurate state of the physical system if the network was not secured properly.
The demonstrations show the importance of effective network security on networked control systems.
Our testbed provides security researchers with an environment where they can assess a variety of security postures and their resilience to cyber-attacks, including assessing SCADA applications and conducting experiments to better understand system effects if networks are insecure and compromised.
VIII. Conclusion and Further Study
Our primary research goal was achieved; we demonstrated real, feasible attacks on a testbed that is comprised of physical, emulated, and simulated control system components. Our testbed successfully passed authentic SCADA protocols and also faithfully passed malicious traffic as an operational system would. We described several demonstration experiments of unsecured systems and potential effects if the network is disrupted. We also demonstrated that vulnerabilities to certain attacks can be eliminated with improved security. We also demonstrated the importance of network security on both the corporate network and control system network.
In our testbed, we demonstrated that the business network could be vulnerable to common known attacks and studied the system impacts. We demonstrated that the attacks used in the testbed all worked and were able to be conducted as described in literature on actual systems. When network security was deployed the vulnerabilities could be eliminated. This environment provides a credible platform to assess cyber-attack scenarios, examine effects of zero-day attacks, and examine effects of patches and un-patched systems. Our testbed also provides a rich training environment to learn and test how to respond to potential cyberattacks. The control system network provides a rich testbed to learn and explore SCADA-specific protocols, applications and devices, as well as the effects of control system attacks on the larger network.
In this research, we have developed an important and capable cyber security analysis and experiment environment (i.e., testbed) to help perform analysis of communication networks and networked information systems. Our developments resulted in a hybrid cyber analysis testbed comprised of simulated, emulated, and real components that leverages existing capabilities where possible. The hybrid testbed enables higher fidelity representations of key computing applications or network devices while still leveraging the scalability and cost advantages of simulation tools. The result is rapidly produced, large, yet relatively low-cost, multi-fidelity representations of networked information systems that enable analysts to quickly 8 of 8
investigate threats, and to test different protection approaches and configurations.
